Patent Silences
Dan L. Burk*
A great deal has been said in recent years about patent disclosure. But
to say that there is a disclosure function in the patent system implies that
there is non-disclosure functioning in the patent system as well. For some
information to be disclosed in a patent, other information must go
undisclosed; for some things to be included, other things must be excluded. In
this article I review the surprising number of doctrines that allow and
encourage patent applicants to remain silent about aspects of their inventions.
I find that some silences in patents are inadvertent, while some are deliberate;
some are necessary, while some are strategic. I conclude that a combination of
such explicit and tacit silences allows patents to function as boundary objects,
that is, as artifacts that have sufficiently definite meaning to be useful in
disparate social worlds, but which simultaneously are sufficiently ambiguous
to become objects of collaboration between disparate social worlds. Because
innovation is known to occur when localized knowledge is transferred across
social boundaries, this function of the patent document is critical to its stated
purpose, and occurs largely because of its open rhetorical spaces. Thus, rather
than fixating on enhanced disclosure, I argue that much of the critical work of
the patent system can and should occur in the open rhetorical spaces where
patents are silent.
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Only in silence the word,
only in dark the light,
only in dying life:
bright the hawk’s flight
on the empty sky.1
INTRODUCTION
The theme of this symposium is “the disclosure function of the
patent system.” A great deal has been said or written in recent years
about patent disclosures, typically about whether they are adequate or
inadequate, read or unread, necessary or unnecessary.2 Depending on
which of these positions is adopted, commentators then generally
advance proposals for more disclosure, or better disclosure, or more
accessible disclosure. Many of the papers in the symposium advance
such arguments or augment previous recommendations along these
lines.3
I wish to turn the theme on its head. To say that there is a
disclosure function in the patent system necessarily implies that there
is non-disclosure functioning in the patent system as well. For some
information to be disclosed in a patent, other information must go
undisclosed; for some things to be included, other things must be
excluded. This holds true as a practical matter; one simply cannot
include everything. But it is also true as a strategic and a conceptual
and a functional matter. What goes unsaid shapes the patent just as
surely as does that which is said; as James Boyd White observed, the
significance of language “lies in silence, in the unstated but accepted

1.
URSULA K. LE GUIN, A WIZARD OF EARTHSEA 7 (1968).
2.
See, e.g., John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent
Definiteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609 (2016); Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function
of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2010) (critiquing disclosure rationales);
Jeanne Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009) (advocating more robust
disclosure requirements); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123
(2006); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 545 (2012); Jason Rantanen, Patent Law's Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
369 (2013); Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2012); Sean Seymore,
The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (2010).
3.
See, e.g., Jonas Anderson, Claiming Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573 (2016) (arguing
that the statutory definiteness standard advances disclosure); Jeanne Fromer, Dynamic Patent
Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1715 (2016) (arguing for post-application supplemental disclosure);
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Law’s Pierson v. Post Problem, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1825 (2016)
(asserting the importance of disclosure for patent timing).
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background against which [words] have their meaning.”4 Only by
understanding what is not disclosed, and why it is not disclosed, can
we get an accurate picture of what is disclosed and why.
Yet patent silences remain unexamined. Consequently, in this
short Article I offer a first survey of such non-disclosures, tracing the
surprising number of doctrines that allow and encourage patent
applicants to remain silent about aspects of their inventions. By
mapping the silences and interludes in patent disclosure, I hope to see
the full contours of the patent as an artifact. Rather than beginning
with a particular expectation as to what patent disclosure should look
like and what it should accomplish, my method here is to survey the
pattern of patent silences to see what characteristics emerge, and then
to ask what purposes the discovered contours of the artifact seem
suited to fulfill.
Much of my focus here will be on the use of language, on what
is properly called rhetoric, not in the pejorative sense of empty or
effusive oratory, but rather in the formal sense of an analysis probing
the social or epistemological content of discourse.5 What goes said and
unsaid in the patent document produces a very specific type of
discourse, framing the invention, and the rights inhering in the
invention, in a very specific way. So this seems the proper set of tools
for considering the role of silence; rhetorical analysis accounts for both
the spoken and the unspoken. As Marianne Constable explains,
rhetoricians “read texts for what they say; and they read texts for
what they don’t say. They read the words of a text; they listen for its
silences. . . . They read between the lines; they read around the lines.”6
From such reading rhetoricians divine the social roles performed by
the texts they examine.
From mapping the silences that are permitted, tolerated, and
even promoted in the patent document, I conclude that patents are
suited to a rather different function than those most often asserted in
discussions of patent disclosure. I shall argue that the pattern of
patent silences allows patents to function as boundary objects. The
concept of the boundary object has emerged from sociological research
to become ubiquitous across a wide range of disciplines,7 but the
4.
JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL
CRITICISM 34 (1994).
5.
See Dan L. Burk & Jessica Reyman, Patents as Genre: A Prospectus, 26 LAW &
LITERATURE 163 (2014) (distinguishing colloquial and technical uses of the term “rhetoric”).
6.
MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST SILENCES: THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF MODERN LAW
17 (2005).
7.
Susan Leigh Star, This Is Not a Boundary Object: Reflections on the Origin of a
Concept, 35 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 601, 604 (2010).
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concept has had surprisingly little purchase in law.8 In general,
boundary objects may be defined as artifacts that have sufficiently
definite meaning to be useful in disparate social worlds, but which
simultaneously are sufficiently ambiguous to become objects of
collaboration between such disparate social worlds.9
Patents certainly exist across disparate social worlds; they
clearly have different meanings in different settings, whether in
finance, management, research, marketing, or law. I will argue that
patents are and should be suited to function as points of contiguity
between these social domains. Because innovation is known to occur
when localized knowledge is transferred across social boundaries,10 I
conclude that this function of the patent document is critical to its
stated purpose and occurs largely because of its open rhetorical
spaces. This suggests that, far from focusing on enhanced disclosure,
we should recognize that much of the critical work of the patent
system can and should occur in the open rhetorical spaces where
patents are silent.11
I. RECONSIDERING DISCLOSURE
Numerous scholars have addressed the question of patent
disclosure, the proposition that patents are intended to communicate
8.
For very rare exceptions, see, for example, Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in
Intellectual Property Law, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 204 (2007), on copyright;
Laura A. Foster, Critical Cultural Translation: A Socio-Legal Framework for Regulatory Orders,
21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 79, 97–100 (2014), on biodiversity; and Gregg P. Macey, The
Architecture of Ignorance, UTAH L. REV. 1627, 1674–75 (2013), on environmental law. Probably
the most extensive exploration of the boundary objects in the legal literature to date is found in
Michael Madison’s deployment of the concept in a limited role in the copyright context. See
Michael J. Madison, The End of the Work as We Know It, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 353–56
(2012); Michael J. Madison, IP Things as Boundary Objects: The Case of the Copyright Work (U.
Pitt. Legal Stud., Working Paper No. 2013–12, 2013) [hereinafter Madison, IP Things as
Boundary Objects].
9.
Susan Leigh Star & James R. Griesemer, Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and
Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology,
1907–39, 19 SOC. STUD. SCI. 387, 393 (1989).
10. DOROTHY LEONARD-BARTON, WELLSPRINGS OF KNOWLEDGE: BUILDING AND SUSTAINING
THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION (1995).
11. I note that some scholars have recently explored certain “negative spaces” where
intellectual property rights are absent or limited. See Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s
Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317, 322–36 (2011) (reviewing the “negative space”
literature). Despite somewhat similar terminology, my inquiry here into rhetorical spaces is
quite different: patent disclosures might create rights by explicitly claiming them, or abnegate
rights by explicitly limiting their scope. Patent silences may reciprocally create rights by
implication or by failing to bound them; they may also relinquish rights by failing to assert them.
Thus there is no necessary connection between patent silences and the absence of rights, and
indeed, the more prolix a patent document becomes, the more limited its scope tends to be.
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information about the claimed invention to the public.12 Much of this
commentary either assumes that robust technical disclosure is a key
purpose for the patent system, or adopts at face value scattered dicta
by the Supreme Court (as well as by inferior courts) asserting
disclosure as a central policy of the patent system.13 Disclosure is said
to be the price for the exclusivity conferred by the patent, making
disclosure the quid pro quo of the inventor’s bargain with the public.
Enrichment of the fund of publicly available information is said to be a
fundamental, if not the fundamental, purpose of the patent system.
Starting from such premises, the scholarly literature critiques various
aspects of the patent system for failing to optimize disclosure, and
typically proposes one or another modification of the system to ensure
more robust—meaning more voluminous and detailed—disclosure.14
Many of these proposals are driven by the somewhat naïve
assumption that if some disclosure is good, more must be better. But
as a general proposition this is simply an untrue, and even a
dangerous, claim to make for nearly any good, whether we are
speaking of information, oxygen, antibiotics, or single malt whiskey.
Disclosure is costly and is not always beneficial. Not only is some
disclosed information irrelevant, tangential, or useless, but
information overload may make it increasingly difficult to locate
pertinent and helpful information in an ocean of disclosure.15 Once the
costs of disclosure pass the point of diminishing returns, more is no
longer better.
A variation on assertions regarding the virtue of disclosure is
that regarding the virtue of certainty: the argument that a more
detailed patent specification provides a more particular and complete
description of the claimed invention, and so provides greater certainty
as to the nature of the patent claims. A first questionable assumption
underlying this assertion is that more words lead to more certainty as
to meaning. While it is true that more information generally lends
greater certainty than does less information,16 and more words offer
12. See, e.g., supra note 2 and sources cited therein.
13. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001)
(discussing the role of disclosure); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974)
(same); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533–34 (1966) (explaining the purposes of disclosure).
14. See, e.g., supra note 2 and sources cited therein.
15. See generally JONATHAN B. SPIRA, OVERLOAD! HOW TOO MUCH INFORMATION IS
HAZARDOUS TO YOUR ORGANIZATION (2011) (describing individual and organizational costs of
information processing).
16. Indeed, one definition of information involves the resolution of uncertainty. See
CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION 29
(10th ed. 1964); see also Dan L. Burk, The Problem of Process in Biotechnology, 43 HOUS. L. REV.
561, 563, 584–88 (2006) (applying information theory to process patents); Deven R. Desai,
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an opportunity to convey more information, given the intractable
incompleteness of language, this assumption only holds true up to a
point. Some uncertainty will always remain, no matter how extensive
the disclosure.17
A second dubious assumption underlying this version of
disclosure is that uncertainty is undesirable because it is costly: that
ambiguity or vagueness in the demarcation of the patent will lead
either to strategic manipulation by the patent holder, who will be
unconstrained by the irrefutable detail of a comprehensive text; or
that it will lead to apprehension among competitors, who will be
anxious over the potential reach of the indeterminate document; or
that it will lead to both. Again, the assumption that uncertainty,
whatever its costs, can be fully eliminated is doubtful. In addition, it is
well understood that excessive certainty in the law can also be
costly.18 A large literature details the drawbacks of enshrining in law
overly rigid and static imperatives, the benefits of sometimes allowing
for legal flexibility, and the circumstances under which each approach
may yield better outcomes.19 Prematurely locking regulatory
requirements into a course of action, or failing to incorporate changing
factual situations into legal decisions, inevitably creates a mismatch
between the law and the regulatory subject, resulting in inefficient
and ineffective over- or under-regulation. Leaving the regulation open,
with details to be supplied later, is frequently the better strategy.
A. Form and Function
Given such countervailing considerations, one might question
on its own terms the line of argument asserting that more patent
disclosure would be better. But one might also simply question the
fundamental premise that disclosure is central, or even important, to
patenting. Critiques of the mismatch between patent praxis and
disclosure policy might be well-founded if one accepts the core
Response: An Information Approach to Trademarks, 100 GEO. L.J. 2119 (2012) (applying
information theory to trademarks); Jeanne Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64
EMORY L.J. 71 (2014) (applying information theory to copyright).
17. See Margaret Jane Radin, Patent Notice and the Trouble with Plain Meaning, 96 B.U.
L. REV. 1093 (2016).
18. Id. at 1113–14.
19. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121 (1999);
Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256
(1995); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93
(2002); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 594 (1988);
Michael Spence & Timothy Endicott, Vagueness in the Scope of Copyright, 121 L.Q. REV. 657, 661
(2005).
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assertion, or assumption, that disclosure is a key feature of the patent
system. If disclosure is a key feature of patents, and patent doctrine
does not provide for it, or does not provide enough of it, then it follows
as night follows day that there is something wrong with patent
doctrine. But I suggest that there is no particular reason to adopt this
stance over the converse proposition: that the patent system is
operating satisfactorily, perhaps even optimally, and the supposed
mismatch stems from incorrect assertions regarding its purpose.
If we provisionally adopt the latter hypothesis, that it is the
assertions regarding disclosure that are mistaken and need correcting,
then we are left with the question as to how they should be corrected,
and also with the corollary question as to how we will know what
corrections are needed. I suggest that the answer to such questions is
to be found in the patent system itself, by observing what the system
is actually doing and then considering whether it is performing that
manifest function well. The method for such consideration is to take
the patent itself, the bundle of doctrines that determine disclosure,
and with fresh eyes examine it to determine its features, then assess
what functions those features might be suited to perform. By treating
the patent much as an archaeologist or anthropologist would treat any
other human artifact, cataloging its characteristics and affordances,
we may draw an inference as to its actual purposes.
Thus, if I believe that the purpose of a screwdriver is to drive
nails—perhaps because the Supreme Court made this assertion
somewhere—and examine the screwdriver, I will certainly conclude
that it is likely to fail in that purpose and that it needs radical
redesign. It is manifestly poorly designed for driving nails. The
screwdriver very obviously does not have the weight or the kind of
level contact surface that would facilitate driving nails; it does not
appear to provide the grip one would want for driving nails. I might
well argue that the flat, flared tip, narrow shaft, and oblong grip
should be reconfigured to something with real weight at one end, a
level pounding surface, and longer haft—in short, that it should look
something more like a hammer.
On the other hand, if I examine the screwdriver without prior
expectations, essentially as a new object, the subject of a sort of
anthropological inquiry that looks at its features and asks what uses
its actual design might allow, I am similarly unlikely to conclude that
it is good for driving nails. But I might notice that its long narrow
shaft and chiseled tip lend themselves to very different uses. I might
well conclude that it is admirably fashioned for something like driving
screws (or possibly for use as an ice pick). If I perhaps further observe
how it is in fact used, and then consider whether it seems to be a good
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tool for that manifest use, I am likely to notice that it is generally used
for driving screws, not nails, and that it actually appears to be fairly
well designed for its actual use. Most importantly, redesigning it as a
hammer would not improve it for screw-driving purposes and would
instead probably make it unusable for its actual employment. Rather
than reformulating the screwdriver, I might do better to reformulate
my understanding of the screwdriver as it exists.
II. MAPPING SILENCES
Although patents are not physical artifacts such as
construction tools, they are human artifacts nonetheless, and they
have a very particular design. The Supreme Court has said that they
are intended as vehicles of disclosure, and numerous commentators
have quite correctly pointed out that, if that is in fact their purpose,
they are very poorly designed indeed. This mismatch between design
and purpose might mean that patents need a thorough redesign. Or,
the mismatch could simply mean that the Supreme Court justices
(and others holding the same viewpoint) are profoundly mistaken.
This would not be any great surprise. There is a vast academic
literature, to which I and many others have contributed, pointing out
how and when the Supreme Court has been mistaken, and sometimes
profoundly mistaken, about what is going on with regard to patents.20
Rather than uncritically accepting the disclosure trope, I have
proposed to instead examine the design of patents without the
disclosure preconception, to see what the design suggests that these
artifacts are supposed to do, or at any rate how they are likely to be
used. This creates a bit of a paradox, however. We are ultimately
concerned with whether patents are suited for something besides
disclosure, so we need to avoid making assumptions about disclosure
while somehow keeping disclosure in mind. I propose to do so by
inventorying patent silences, to see what patents do not and need not
say. Such an examination of patent silences allows a fresh look at the
reciprocal characteristics of patents, contrasting discursive spaces
with discursive content.
There is, of course, a danger in this approach. Contrasting the
discursive spaces of patents with their discursive content sets up a
dualism reflected in the epigraph that heads this essay, a division
between that which is articulated and that which goes unarticulated. I
20. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505 (2014) (discussing the incoherent Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding patentable subject matter); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U.
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256 (2015) (same).
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am well aware of the danger of dualism, in particular the danger that
switching to the reciprocal of a binary pair may be just as misleading
as not switching.21 But a considerable measure of thought over the
past several decades, in a variety of disciplines, has gone toward the
question of identifying and traversing the dualisms that remain latent
in our social constructs.22 This work suggests that much of the danger
posed by dualisms occurs when they are unacknowledged and
unrecognized. The first step toward traversing dualisms is to identify
and characterize them.
In the present instance, traversing the apparent dualism
begins with the recognition that silence is not monolithic, but contains
multitudes. Much as does disclosure, silence encompasses a broad
range of conditions and circumstances.23 Silence often indicates an
absence of information, but such an absence may stem from a variety
of circumstances. Silence sometimes indicates concealment, that
information has been actively and intentionally withheld. Silence may
also indicate absent information that was forgotten, or unknown, or
perhaps even unknowable. Silence may similarly indicate the absence
of information that, while known or apprehended, cannot be put into
words; in other words, information that is uncodifiable.24 Silence may
be purely functional, as ground to communicative figure, allowing
discrete concepts to be perceived. Perhaps most importantly, silence,
whether audible or textual, is just as often communicative as it is
noncommunicative.25
This general bestiary of silences applies to specific patent
silences; they likewise stem from a variety of conditions. Patent
silence may represent practical acquiescence to the demands of an
examiner, rightly or wrongly. Or it may represent an incompatibility
between some aspect of the invention and the regulatory or statutory
criteria for patenting. Or it may represent the indescribability of tacit

21.
22.

See Burk, supra note 8.
See Dan L. Burk, Copyright and the New Materialism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ACCESS TO IM/MATERIAL GOODS 44, 45 (Jessica Lai & Antoinette Maget Dominicé eds., 2016)
(noting that modern scholars are beginning to focus on the centrality of matter in their
evaluation of copyright law).
23. See Muriel Saville-Troike, The Place of Silence in an Integrated Theory of
Communication, in PERSPECTIVES ON SILENCE 3, 4–5 (Deborah Tannen & Muriel Saville-Troike
eds., 1985) (explaining the various dimensions of silence); see also Michal Ephratt, The Functions
of Silence, 40 J. PRAGMATICS 1909, 1912 (2008) (diagramming different types of silences).
24. Cf. Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1009 (2008) (explaining the patent system’s impact on knowledge management).
25. Saville-Troike, supra note 23, at 4.
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knowledge associated with the invention.26 Or it may be calculated,
strategic non-disclosure. It is due to the multiplicity of patent silences
that I use the term silence here advisedly.27 In speaking of patent
silences as the antithesis of patent disclosure, I might have spoken in
terms of patent non-disclosure, but that term carries connotations that
I prefer not to invoke. I am interested in the empty spaces in the text,
arising both from both non-disclosure and from the negative reciprocal
of disclosure.
A. Mapping Disclosure
If we are to use patent silence to frame patent disclosure, it
would be well at the outset to recognize that there are several
different types of disclosure occurring in the patent document, or
perhaps more accurately, to recognize that several different kinds of
information are lumped together, perhaps improperly, under the
generalized concept of disclosure. Many, though by no means all of
these are associated with the disclosure provisions in § 112 of the
patent statute.28 Explicit in the text of the statute is the requirement
that some have labeled the “teaching function” of the patent,29
requiring the patentee to teach those of ordinary skill how to make
and use the invention. Much of the recent commentary surrounding
disclosure has focused on whether this function occurs well, or poorly,
or at all.
But disclosure performs a number of other implicit functions as
well. Discursive features of the specification that are mentioned in the
statute, such as the written description requirement or claim
definiteness, are typically justified or explained on the basis of some
disclosure function that is unarticulated in the statute, and instead
has been developed in judicial glosses. For example, the patent
specification is said to perform a “notice function” by putting the
public on notice as to what technology is off limits—that is, what
technological bounds they would need to cross to trigger infringement
liability.30 At the same time the specification is also said to keep the
26. Indeed, for knowledge or practice that lies outside the articulated bounds of the patent,
the intellectual property recourse is trade secrecy—an active form of silence that suppresses
open disclosure, at least most of the time. Secrecy may be a strategic option for valuable
information that might remain proprietary beyond the term of the patent, or it may be a
necessary and unavoidable contingency for information that is tacit and uncodifiable. See Burk,
supra note 24, at 1021.
27. Cf. Saville-Troike, supra note 23, at 5 (noting that writing, like speech, has silences).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
29. See, e.g., Seymore, supra note 2.
30. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2130 (2014).
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inventor from overreaching, by specifying the limitations of the
technology to which the inventor has claim.31 Patent disclosure is also
said to indicate the inventor’s “possession” of the claimed invention—
that is, to demonstrate that the inventor can describe the technology
in sufficient detail to ensure invention of what she claims.32
Possession in this sense is clearly a term of art, as the inventor
need not have physical or actual possession of the invention.33 In the
nineteenth century, patent applicants were required to submit a
working model of their invention to the Patent Office as part of the
process for obtaining a patent.34 This practice has long since gone by
the wayside in favor of purely textual elucidations of the invention.
While there are occasional calls to renew versions of the old practice,35
it is clear that a custom which might have made sense for nineteenth
century applications that were primarily mechanical in nature would
today be utterly impractical and logistically disastrous. Today’s Patent
Office receives well over 500,000 applications a year; setting aside the
enormous problems of receiving, processing, and storing working
models, it is unclear what it would mean to submit a “working model”
for biological, chemical, and process-based inventions.
Such practicality dictates certain silences as well as their
reciprocal disclosures. One mediation of the disclosure–non-disclosure
boundary in patents may simply be required by relative costs and
benefits; it is simply not feasible, nor even desirable, to maximize the
information content of patents. Every patent drafter (or for that
matter, any document drafter) knows that deliberate choices must be
made regarding what to leave out of the specification, if only because
the document at some point will begin to become unwieldy and
prolix.36 Complete disclosure would of course, in any event, be
impossible, requiring some hypothetical Borges text that would

31. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938); Evans v.
Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433–34 (1822).
32. In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also Holbrook, supra note 2
(arguing for the primacy of the possession rationale in disclosure).
33. Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
34. Alain Pottage, Law Machines: Scale Models, Forensic Materiality, and the Making of
Modern Patent Law, 41 SOC. STUD. SCI. 621 (2011).
35. See, e.g., Seymore, supra note 2 (arguing that patent examiners should be able to
demand working examples of applicants); see also Ouellette, supra note 3 (arguing that
examiners must require applicants to “show their work”).
36. This textual inevitability has long been recognized in contract theory. See Oliver Hart
& John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988) (arguing
that parties to a contract make up for “incompleteness” by keeping the document susceptible to
revision).
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reference every aspect of the invention from first principles on.37 Since
complete disclosure within the document is neither possible nor
desirable, the drafter is inevitably forced to rely upon knowledge
external to the patent text, including, of course, the knowledge
necessary to decipher and interpret the text.38 The question then
becomes how reliant on external knowledge the drafter is permitted to
be.
Thus, patent doctrine fully expects that not all the information
necessary to make and use the invention need be found in the patent
document. To complete the information disclosed in the patent, the
patent drafter is permitted to rely on the knowledge legally imputed to
the person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”),39 including
the basic knowledge common to practitioners in the field, the common
terminology in the field, and the skills that would be fundamental to
the particular field.40 There is again some danger in relying on the
knowledge common to the art; if the drafter remains silent on an
essential topic, while also wrongly expecting that it would be part of
the PHOSITA’s fund of knowledge, then the disclosure remains
incomplete and the patent fails the enablement requirement.
The corollary is that the PHOSITA is something of an idiot
savant. The PHOSITA is presumed to have a thorough knowledge of
all the prior art in a way that no natural entity possibly could, but its
knowledge is limited to the field of invention.41 The PHOSITA may
also have insights into other fields when they are relevant to the
question the inventor was trying to solve.42 But this will never be
enough to implement an invention in practice, and the missing
practical information need not be supplied by the inventor. Black
letter patent law tells us that the patent is not a production document;
the inventor need not specify the precise location of every nut, bolt,
solder, or sinter found in the invention.43 And neither is the patent an
operations manual. While the patent statute requires enablement of
37. Jorge Luis Borges was an Argentine writer whose stories frequently incorporated
paradoxes on the infinite, such as his 1975 short story, The Book of Sand, concerning an
unbounded fictional text. GENE H. BELL-VILLADA, BORGES AND HIS FICTION: A GUIDE TO HIS
MIND AND ART (1999). Similar concepts appear in other stories, such as the 1941 story, The
Garden of Forking Paths, which revolves around a labyrinthine novel in which multiple plot lines
occur simultaneously. Id. at 101.
38. See Burk, supra note 24, at 1016.
39. John O. Tresansky, PHOSITA—the Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in Patent Law,
73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 37 (1991).
40. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
41. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
42. In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
43. In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
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the invention,44 it does not necessarily require information to enable
the network of apparatus and practices that must unquestionably
surround the invention—the maintenance schedule, operator training,
safety procedures, tax consequences, management oversight, and so
on.45 Some of these details may be filled in by those of skill in the art,
but much of this silence requires the expertise of those in other arts,
such as accounting or human resources, which may be entirely
unrelated to the field of the invention.
B. Optional Silences
And so here I begin to trace the outline of the unspoken
intervals in the patent document. Patent silences are often the
reciprocal spaces defined by the contours of affirmative disclosures,
the information that goes unarticulated after disclosure ends or runs
out. Indeed, patent silences are most often just that: the disclosure
comes to an end, and whatever lies beyond that revelation goes
undiscussed. Such lacunae are determined negatively by the strategy
or purpose of the disclosure; once the purpose of the disclosure has
been satisfied, the drafter falls silent.
But in some cases, the silence is explicit and formalized; patent
doctrine affirmatively identifies a particular topic or feature of the
invention regarding which nothing need be said. In other cases,
silence is the inevitable result of the inventor being required to speak
or disclose information in a certain way, which precludes disclosure in
any other way. In a few cases the inventor is affirmatively forbidden
from addressing certain information. More often the silence is
permissive; the inventor may offer certain information but need not do
so. Where silence is permissive, there is often a penalty for either
intentionally or inadvertently misjudging the degree of reticence
allowed.
For example, patents may include working examples, that is, a
description of an embodiment or utilization of the invention that has
actually been performed. But it is black letter patent law that working
examples are not required; indeed, the invention need not have been
actually reduced to practice prior to filing a patent application.46 The
patent drafter can substitute other kinds of disclosures sufficient to
enable the invention. Examples, if they are offered at all, may be

44.
45.
46.

35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
Burk, supra note 24, at 1021.
Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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“prophetic” or hypothetical.47 There may of course be advantages to
including a working example, as it can provide a concrete embodiment
that helps stave off a potential Patent Office rejection for lack of
enablement. Yet, at the same time, including prophetic examples may
be something of a risk to the applicant, as failure of the prediction
would render the patent non-enabled and it might have been better to
have remained silent. The applicant, or patent drafter, is left to weigh
the benefits and risks and determine whether to stay silent regarding
working examples.
This is also generally the case where disclosures are required.
As a practical matter, the applicant prognosticates the needed level of
disclosure—the degree of disclosure required by law is almost entirely
set at the time of filing, so that what is disclosed needs to be disclosed
as of the filing date.48 With few exceptions, the examiner who believes
the disclosure is inadequate has little ability to demand additional
information, at least with regard to that application. During the
course of administrative patent prosecution, amendments are made to
the claims, not to the rest of the specification, and disclosure is judged
in relation to the claims—if the disclosure is inadequate to support the
claims, the claims must be narrowed. But the opposite is not true: it is
essentially forbidden to expand or refine the disclosure to shore up
overbroad claims, and if the disclosure is so defective that it cannot
support any claims, the application might be rejected or go abandoned.
The patent applicant’s choice between silence and disclosure is
frequently mediated by procedural presumptions, for example, in the
case of the patentability requirement to show utility. The patent
applicant is generally not required to prove utility in the operational
sense, only to state some plausible use.49 The assertion of such utility
by the applicant is generally assumed to be true, unless on its face the
application is so far removed from the established tenets of science
and engineering so as to constitute “fantastic utility.”50 Applications
drawn to perpetual motion machines or other devices that obviously
violate physical law will be flagged by the examining corps and
rejected. Only then does the applicant who wishes to proceed need to
produce data, models, or other evidence that the invention is operable.
But such supplemental submissions are tendered as evidence
supporting the assertions already existing in the application, not as a
47. In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
48. See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV.
101, 106–07 (2005) (noting that it “makes sense” that the terms of the claim are established by
the date of application).
49. In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
50. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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broadening of the disclosure itself; neither are they incorporated into
the application itself, although they will be included in the prosecution
history.
C. Unaddressed Audiences
Patent disclosure is purportedly intended to convey details of
the invention to a reader and to put the reader on notice as to what
technology is exclusive. The expectation that patents perform these
functions for certain audiences dictates the degree of disclosure
necessary to that audience.51 The patent may be silent with regard to
other audiences besides those contemplated for disclosure. So in
cataloging patent silences we may ask: To whom are patents not
addressed? To what audiences may patents remain silent?
Others have previously observed that patents are addressed to
technical experts.52 For our purposes, this observation is a bit
incomplete but remains a good place to start. Given that the disclosure
is by statutory terms directed to enabling those of skill in the art,53
this statutory provision conversely implies that patents are not
addressed to those without skill in the art. There is no requirement
that the patent school the unskilled. The patent may remain silent on
matters that those of skill already know, and need not speak to the
unskilled who know less. This unaddressed audience includes both
those in the art who do not have the ordinary level of skill and those
who are entirely outside the art. And despite occasional judicial
language regarding notice to the public, the language of the statute
indicates that the patent is decidedly not addressed to the lay public.54
This also implies that the patent is ostensibly not addressed to
judges, nor to lawyers, who at first glance would not seem to be those
of skill in the art. But we should perhaps not embrace that conclusion
too quickly. First, the patent document is likely to be written by a
lawyer, albeit a lawyer with technical training.55 In order to practice
before the Patent Office, a patent lawyer or agent is required to have a
technical background. If it is ever licensed or enforced, the document

51. See Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72
(2012); see also Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property
Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1262–63 (2014) (observing that patent claims are
addressed to an “expert” audience).
52. See Fromer & Lemley, supra note 51.
53. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
54. See Fromer & Lemley, supra note 51.
55. See Burk & Reyman, supra note 5, at 176 (describing the requirement of technical
training for patent lawyers).
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will be interpreted by lawyers who may not have technical training.56
Certainly if it is enforced it will be interpreted by trial judges without
technical training. Thus as a practical matter, the document is written
by lawyers for lawyers, even if that is not what the statute specifies.57
Second, and perhaps surprisingly, patents are not addressed to
inventors, or at least not to inventors whose skill rises to the level
needed for patentable invention. Inventors are by definition those of
extraordinary skill in the art; if what an innovator accomplishes can
be accomplished by one of ordinary skill, it fails the non-obviousness
test for patentability.58 Thus the inventor who addresses a patent to
her peers, to those of extraordinary skill, fails the statutory
enablement requirement—the disclosure must be accessible and
comprehensible, to one of merely ordinary skill.
Neither is the patent addressed to patent examiners, or at least
the statute does not require this. As a practical consideration, patent
examiners will review the application and are as a matter of course an
important audience to keep in mind. But so far as patenting
requirements go, even though patent examiners may be among those
of at least ordinary skill in the art, they are not the audience. It is
critical here to remember that the statute does not require the
document to be accessible to any actual individuals of skill in the art.
And while examiners are certainly individuals of skill in the art, they
are not the fictional PHOSITAs, as those are contemplated in the
statute.59 The PHOSITA is a legal standard, not any actual person or
group of persons,60 so comprehensibility to the fictional PHOSITA may
or may not translate into comprehensibility by natural entities.
With regard to actual persons of skill, arguments over the
degree to which patents are in fact useful to technicians have been a
mainstay of disclosure scholarship.61 Patents are indeed couched in
technical terms and to some extent communicate technical
information, if perhaps not in the degree of detail that a technical

56. Id. at 178.
57. See John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive
Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 334
(2008).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
59. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 888 (2004); Tresansky, supra note 39, at
50–54.
60. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(“The person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person . . . .”).
61. See supra note 2 and sources cited therein.
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community might demand.62 Certainly the patent disclosure must be
technically sufficient for the claimed invention to have some purchase
in the material world; enablement demands that what is described
must work in an operational sense.63 But as I have pointed out in
previous work, the technical description encompassed by the patent is
not that demanded by an actual technician, but rather that geared to
the PHOSITA, a construct fashioned by lawyers.64 Thus, as a legal
matter, the patent need not speak to the examiner or even to other
natural artisans so long as it speaks to the PHOSITA.
Further, the characteristics of the PHOSITA are largely
defined, not by reference to natural artisans, but by reference to a
defined set of documents.65 These constituent texts, which are not
necessarily incorporated into or even explicitly referenced by the
patent text, are in turn the aggregate standard by which patentability
is determined. The definition of the invention requires both separation
from, and relation to, such prior art.66 For example, in order to satisfy
the novelty requirement, the claimed invention must be distinct from
what has gone before; to satisfy the non-obviousness requirement, it
must be significantly distinct from what has gone before. Even to
qualify as patentable subject matter, the Supreme Court has said that
the invention must—in some fashion that is not entirely clear—
surpass what has gone before.67 Much of the patent disclosure
therefore characterizes the invention as a figure against the ground of
the prior art. But that means that it is the differences from the prior
art that will be emphasized in the patent, and routine similarities will
often go unstated—additional defining silences.

62. See David Phillip Miller, Watt in Court: Specifying Steam Engines and Classifying
Engineers in the Patent Trials of the 1790s, in 27 HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 44, 45–46 (Ian
Inkster ed., 2007); Greg Myers, From Discovery to Invention: The Writing and Rewriting of Two
Patents, 25 SOC. STUD. SCI. 57, 93 (1995).
63. See Geof Bowker, What’s in a Patent?, in SHAPING TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING SOCIETY:
STUDIES IN SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE 53, 69 (Wiebe E. Bijker & John Law eds., 1994) (describing
the process of aligning material practice with patent assertion).
64. See Burk & Reyman, supra note 5, at 182; see also Golden, supra note 57, at 327
(arguing that patent claims must address both technical operability and legal meaning).
65. I say here “largely,” because the Supreme Court has suggested that patents may be at
least partly based upon “common sense” and other practical instincts that may not be recorded in
the prior art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
66. Myers, supra note 62, at 84.
67. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014) (holding
that patentable subject matter must entail an “inventive concept”).
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D. Claiming Silence
Much of patent silence clusters around the claims. Patent
disclosure is often associated with the “specification,” which is the
detailed written description of the invention. Those who have not
practiced in the patent field (as well as more than a few of those who
have) tend to forget that claims are part of the patent specification.68
There is a tendency to speak casually of the non-claiming portions of
the document—the drawings, the examples, the textual description—
as the specification. But in fact the claims work together with the rest
of the disclosure to specify the characteristics of the invention. And,
conversely, we can infer that claims work together with nondisclosures to specify the characteristics of the invention.
Perhaps more importantly, the claims work in a very real sense
against the rest of the disclosure, in a kind of dynamic tension that
constrains the scope of exclusivity. The enablement standard requires
disclosure commensurate with the claims: the claims must be
supported by the disclosure, and the breadth of the disclosure dictates
the permissible breadth of the claims.69 This creates both parallel and
reciprocal relationships between the respective disclosures and
silences in the claims and in the rest of the supporting document. If
the applicant discloses more, she can claim more; if the applicant
discloses less, then she must claim less. This creates a relationship
between disclosures and silences. The applicant may remain silent on
matters she does not wish to claim, and there may in fact be penalties
for disclosing and not claiming aspects of an invention; these may be
effectively dedicated to the public.70
Thus, the claims exist not only in tension with the remainder of
the specification, but in a kind of symbiosis. The claims are not and
need not be a full exposition of the invention—where the claims are
silent, needed information may be referenced elsewhere in the patent.
Every patent student knows that the claims are to be read in light of
the disclosure in the rest of the specification.71 But at the same time,
the claims must to some degree stand on their own; there remains a
strict prohibition on reading into the claims limitations drawn from
elsewhere in the specification.72 The line between these two demands
is indeterminate, often leaving the observer to wonder how these rules
68. In re Benno, 768 F.2d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
69. Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
70. Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm., USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
71. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
72. Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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could possibly coexist. But they define a very particular range of
permissible silence between the claims and their supporting texts.
Certain silences within the claims may be filled, if at all, by
information not found in the patent itself. The claims may, for
example, use terms undefined in the patent, so long as they are known
in the art, thus relying again on the fabricated universe of prior art
known to the PHOSITA.73 Patent claims may also remain silent
regarding embodiments of the invention that fail to function. Broad
genus claims, covering entire classes of invention, may well encompass
both functional embodiments of the invention and others that do not
work. But existence of the latter inoperable species of the invention
within the scope of the claims neither defeats the claimed invention’s
utility nor negates its enablement. It is sufficient for the patentee to
supply guidance as to how inoperable species may be recognized and
avoided.74 For that matter, the patentee need not disclose inoperable
species, or even how to identify and avoid inoperable species, if this is
knowledge that the PHOSITA would already possess.75
E. Temporal Silences
Some patent silences are a function of time.76 There are, for
example, strong incentives for inventors to remain silent concerning
discoveries related to the invention that are made subsequent to their
patent filing. Applicants are forbidden from introducing “new matter”
into a pending application; changing the application disclosure
changes the definition of the invention, so that what is under
consideration becomes in effect a new application.77 The clock then
starts over, with a new priority date for the new application
concerning the new invention—potentially a serious handicap in a
system that rewards the first to file. In effect, the applicant is not
permitted to change her mind regarding the nature of the invention;
she is limited to the invention as described on the filing date.
This restriction on new matter serves to stabilize the version of
the invention under consideration during the application process. Yet
73. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 1958); Standard Oil
Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 585 F. Supp. 1481, 1488 (E.D. La. 1984), aff’d, 774 F.2d 448 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
74. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–37 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
75. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
76. Cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Disclosures and Time, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1459 (2016)
(exploring how the nature of patent disclosures varies based on the temporal contexts being
considered).
77. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2012).
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technology advances over time, and the inventor’s understanding will
likely advance, not just during the lifetime of the patent, but during
the course of the patent application process. The best that can be done
with incremental changes to the technology is to file continuations in
part (“CIPs”), in which the new matter accrues a new filing date, and
the portions of the disclosure that are carried forward from the
previous version of the application retain the original filing date. But
if the new discoveries or understanding are not themselves patentable,
they will not be reflected in CIPs and will go undisclosed.
At the same time, other patent silences may serve to passively
incorporate advances in technology. Thanks to the new matter rule,
the patent is, of course, silent on the characteristics of technical
advances subsequent to its drafting; neither the inventor nor the
patent drafter are required to be precognitive. But patent doctrine
allows the scope of the document to progress over time, permitting the
silence regarding technical advances to become infused with meaning
as technology changes.78 The patent thus routinely covers technologies
that it did not, and indeed that it could not, disclose at the time of
filing.79
Such patent doctrines incorporate features that address the
changing context of the patent’s exclusivity. Probably the best known
of these is the enablement paradox, which allows the patent to
encompass new versions of an invention subsequent to the patent
filing date so long as the version of the invention contemporary with
its application date is fully enabled.80 Kevin Collins has suggested
that this characteristic is not so much temporal as it is a type of
modulation between ideational and denotational meanings in the
document; for purposes of patentability the meaning of the disclosure
must be referential, while for purposes of infringement it is
conceptual.81 In either conception, the doctrine allows the patent to
encompass new technical developments.
A similar doctrine appears in the context of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, under which the patent’s claims are regarded as
encompassing known substitutes for elements of the claimed
invention. This penumbra of exclusivity prevents infringers from
making trivial changes to their devices in order to avoid the literal

78. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
79. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Philips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1251–52 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In
re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
80. U.S. Steel Corp., 865 F.2d at 1251–52.
81. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083,
1099–1100 (2009).
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text of the claims.82 But at the same time, patent holders are not
permitted to capture within their equivalents penumbra embodiments
of the invention that they previously represented to the Patent Office
were not part of the invention—the scope of equivalents is limited by
this doctrine of prosecution history estoppel.83 The Supreme Court has
also indicated that such estoppel is limited to substitutions within the
contemplation of the art at the time the patent was obtained.84 In
other words, substitutions that were not foreseeable at the time that
the patentee surrendered a range of equivalents by estoppel are not
excluded from the later scope of the patent’s exclusivity. Thus, the
range of equivalents may include later-arising technology.
III. PATENTS AT THE BOUNDARY
Although there are undoubtedly additional lacunae to be
explored within patent doctrine and practice, the survey of silences I
have undertaken to this point should convey a palpable outline of the
document’s contours. It is clearly a document for which disclosure is
not paramount, entertaining not simply a few unintended omissions,
but multiple deliberate silences. It is a document in which certain
spaces are meant to be filled by an attendant constellation of
concurrent and prior documents, but in which certain spaces are
meant never to be filled at all. It is a document whose meaning is not
intrinsic, but is rather dependent on the legal and technical
communities that surround it. It is a document whose content shifts
with context, where certain dimensions are fixed at particular points
in time, but whose meaning in other respects changes over time.
As I have suggested above, this profile may not lend itself
wholly, or even primarily, to the purposes of teaching or notice, but it
surely has its purposes. In particular, these features map surprisingly
well onto the extensive literature investigating “boundary objects.”
Beginning in sociology, and then increasingly in myriad other
disciplines, research has recognized artifacts that function at the
boundaries, or the overlap, between different social worlds. These
boundary objects exist at the intersection of different communities,
82. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950).
83. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733–35 (2002).
84. Id. at 738–41. Silence in the file wrapper may itself trigger prosecution history
estoppel: an unexplained narrowing claim amendment that excludes equivalents is presumed to
be related to “patentability” and so falls into the category of amendments that later estop
assertion of those equivalents. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17
(1997). Such silence is ostensibly outside the patent document—one does not explain
amendments in the patent itself—but demonstrates that silences in the documents attending the
patent may impact the contours of the patent.
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belonging to different domains without fully belonging to any of
them.85 Boundary objects have a different identity and meaning in
each of the multiple domains that they inhabit.
But the boundary object is not simply an artifact that is viewed
differently in different contexts—were that its only attribute, nearly
anything at any time could qualify as a boundary object.86 Rather, the
boundary object has a tightly structured role and meaning within a
given social world, but is also sufficiently loosely structured that it can
be imbued with different meanings in other social worlds. Star and
Griesemer, who famously originated the notion of the boundary object,
define the concept as comprising “objects which are both plastic
enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several
parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common
identity across sites.”87
These features of the boundary object provide a point of
commonality where disparate communities can collaborate and where
contested meanings can be negotiated. In doing so, they facilitate
communication and cooperation between social domains, and allow
resolution of disparate interests that potentially conflict. This is not to
say that the resolution consists of consensus; rather, the alignment of
interests via boundary objects typically permits different interests to
coexist without conformity. Boundary objects allow their different
constituencies to collaborate on shared work while retaining differing
and even conflicting interests. To do so, boundary objects must be
simultaneously fluid and stable, depending on the context in which
they are employed and depending on whether they are functioning
locally or between localities.
Bowker and Star argued that boundary objects tend to arise
organically in order to mediate the interaction of disparate
communities, but deliberately engineered boundary objects have also
been observed.88 Attempts to create boundary objects may fail because
the engineered objects lack the needed ambiguity to become
simultaneously useful to members of multiple domains.89 To function
as a boundary object, an artifact acquires local meaning as each social
world infuses the artifact with significance. But this can only occur at
the interstices of the object, where the particular affordances of the
object are sufficiently multivalent to accommodate different social
85. Star & Griesemer, supra note 9, at 411.
86. See Star, supra note 7.
87. Star & Griesemer, supra note 9, at 393.
88. GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 305–06 (1999).
89. Id.

2016]

PATENT SILENCES

1625

meanings. Thus, ambiguity or incomplete social structuring of the
object allows communities to imbue the object with their own content
and interpretation.90
It is this modulation between abstraction and specificity that
allows an object to function at the overlapping margins of different
social worlds, and, critically, to serve as a “passage point” for
information between social worlds. In particular for our consideration
here, these characteristics allow boundary objects to perform an
important role in fostering innovation.91 Studies of innovation, and
particularly of innovation within organizational settings, indicate that
innovation is most likely to occur when information is combined across
specialized domains, producing new combinations of previously
sequestered knowledge.92 Separation of specialized information thus
presents both an opportunity for and an impediment to innovation.
Boundaries between specialties create the opportunity for innovation
when information transfer occurs across them, and simultaneously
present a barrier to innovation that inhibits such information
transfer.93
This implies that innovation requires some mechanism for
transfer across disciplinary barriers while at the same time
maintaining such barriers. Boundary objects are superbly positioned
to simultaneously perform both functions, and studies of information
transfer have recognized the central role played by boundary objects
in performing such seemingly contradictory roles.94 Typical boundary
objects that have been studied in the organizational setting include
documents such as blueprints or design specifications, as well as scale
models, databases, and similar informational resources.95 All of these
may provide useful information to their constituent user communities,
but they more importantly have been seen to provide points of
interaction and negotiation. For such informational artifacts, textual
90. Elaine K. Yakura, Charting Time: Timelines as Temporal Boundary Objects, 45 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 956, 957–58 (2002).
91. Paul R. Carlile, A Pragmatic View of Knowledge and Boundaries: Boundary Objects in
New Product Development, 13 ORG. SCI. 442 (2002); Chris Kimble, Corinne Grenier & Karine
Goglio-Primard, Innovation and Knowledge Sharing Across Professional Boundaries: Political
Interplay Between Boundary Objects and Brokers, 30 INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 437 (2010).
92. See LEONARD-BARTON, supra note 10, at 59–61.
93. Carlile, supra note 91, at 442.
94. Id.; Paul R. Carlile, Transferring, Translating and Transforming Knowledge: An
Integrative Framework for Managing Knowledge Across Boundaries, 15 ORG. SCI, 555, 555
(2004).
95. Clifford Oswick, Boundary Objects and Organizational Knowledge: A Discursive
Perspective 7–8 (University of Leicester Management Centre, Working Paper, 2005),
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/conf/olkc/archive/oklc6/papers/oswick.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8PEY-262M].
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ambiguities or lacunae offer opportunities for local interpretation or
for interstitial negotiation, while points of textual particularity offer
commonality across boundaries.
Patents fit fairly naturally into the schema of such resources;
the patent document may facilitate movement of technical information
between technical communities of practice, but, like analogous
informational boundary objects, this is likely the least of its
functions.96 Rather, the contours that I have here identified, of patent
particularity and silence, suggest that the patent may operate as a
boundary object, mediating the interaction of multiple communities
that surround the document. While the patent is a common object in
these different communities, it has different significance in each of
them, and is adapted to different uses in each of the different
communities clustered around it.97
There has already been some initial recognition of the
knowledge communities surrounding patent practice. For example,
Professor Laura Pedraza-Fariña has explored influence of patent law’s
obviousness doctrine as it relates to innovation among communities of
practice.98 Relatedly, in previous work with Professor Jessica Reyman,
I have discussed the multiple rhetorical communities that surround
the creation and enforcement of the patent document: practitioners,
litigators, inventors, technology transfer officers, patent examiners,
judges, and others engaged in shaping the “typified social action” of
patent texts.99 This point may be taken further, to consider the
communities that intersect at the patent document in regard to
technological development and commercialization.
As a hybrid document,100 written and interpreted by lawyers in
technical language, intended as a market commodity, the patent has a
96. Mark Lemley appears to offer indirect evidence of this view when he observes that a
substantial body of empirical data shows behavior regarding patent procurement and
enforcement appears completely unperturbed by significant changes in patent doctrine. See
Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System 19–20 (Stanford Public Law,
Working Paper No. 2784456, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2784456
[https://perma.cc/YL6E-SX5Q]. The most plausible interpretation of this behavior seems to be
that, whatever patents are being used for, it has little to do with the legal characteristics
attributed to the document. Id.
97. In a discussion of copyrighted works as boundary objects, Mike Madison mentions in
passing the likely provenance of the patented invention as a boundary object. See Madison, IP
Things as Boundary Objects, supra note 8. While I would not necessarily disagree with that
observation, my focus here is broader than the concept of the invention, considering the patent
document and its multiple associated valences as boundary objects.
98. See Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Patent Law and the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 WIS. L.
REV. 813.
99. See Burk & Reyman, supra note 5, at 175.
100. See id. at 185.
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foothold in multiple communities that generally must interact in order
for innovation to occur: engineering and technical experts, legal
practitioners, investors, business planners, marketers, manufacturers,
and others. Each of these communities encompasses its own
specialized language, goals, norms, expectations, practices, and
training. These actors have heterogeneous interests drawn from the
norms and expectations of their different fields: advancing knowledge,
turning a profit, finding elegant technological solutions, enhancing the
organization’s reputation, placating shareholders, outmaneuvering
competitors, and so on. These goals are not necessarily consonant or
even congruent.
Thus, each of the relevant communities will tend toward a
different view of the patent’s significance and purpose.101 Some view
the patent as a potential source of licensing revenue or as a
bargaining chip in strategic alliances. Some may view it as an
indicator of firm value. Some may view it as a marker of technological
expertise. Some view it as a marketing asset or as an advertising
feature.102 Some may view it as an impediment to freedom to operate
or as a warning against entering certain technological areas. But in
order for innovation to occur, actors from these disparate social worlds
typically will need to collaborate, meaning that there is a need for
specialized knowledge transfer between them—the licensing officer
needs to understand the capabilities of the technology; the business
planner needs to understand the scope of the available rights; the
technologist needs to understand which information is required to
support the legal assertions of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness.
The interaction of these differing communities becomes
manifest if we consider the multiple converging purposes in an act
such as patent licensing.103 The patent will presumably only be
licensed if it meets the business and technical requirements of the
licensee’s organization; it must also further the business and legal
101. See Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 143 (2000) (analyzing how patents are viewed in various industries).
102. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A
Proposal for a New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. SMALL
& EMERGING BUS. L. 5 (2000); Mercedes Benz, 2013 Mercedes Benz E 350 TV Commercial,
Patents, YOUTUBE (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OYxmQShZ2Hw
[https://perma.cc/TL38-M9YM] (touting the eighty thousand patents held by Mercedes Benz as
demonstrating the company’s leadership in automotive innovation); see also Daniel June, “80,000
Patents” the Advertised Selling Point of Mercedes-Benz E-Class, JDJOURNAL (Mar. 20, 2012),
http://www.jdjournal.com/2012/03/20/80000-patents-is-advertised-as-mercedes-benz-e-classsselling-point/ [https://perma.cc/EWS5-2VBZ] (describing this the Mercedes marketing campaign).
103. Cf. Michael Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039,
2048 (2009) (arguing that intellectual property licenses bridge boundaries between knowledge
domains).
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aspirations of the licensor. Licensing the patent may provide
simultaneously to different patent constituencies freedom to operate, a
source of revenue, a cost of production, a hedge against competition, a
commitment to future legal action, a conduit of technical expertise.104
The licensed patent is also frequently a bargaining chip for collateral
negotiation toward collaboration or the transfer of know-how related
to the patent.105 It may provide a securitized asset or commodity.106
The patent in this context becomes a passage point between multiple
disciplinary realms, aligning disparate networks of actors and
resources toward a particular transaction.
And here it is that the interstices of the patent become
essential. Some commentators have claimed that the patent can only
function if its bounds are certain,107 but this is only true—if indeed it
is true at all108—with respect to local knowledge within a given social
world. We have seen that patent doctrine preserves multiple spaces in
which patents remains silent, maintaining ambiguities that may be
satisfied or imbued with meanings as needed at different points in the
life of the document. The patent provides a natural point of mediation,
which largely occurs in the interstices between the local meanings of
the document’s disclosure.
It is what is not said in the document that allows it to maintain
different identities in different social worlds. Indeed, the silences in
the patent may themselves be negotiated. To one community, silence
may signify that which is known and so obvious that it need not be
recapitulated; to another, it may signify that which is yet to be
discovered. To one community, it may represent future opportunity; to
another, it may represent familiar convention. Silence may offer a
space to be filled by contractual specification or by standard business
practice. While disclosures provide commonality, silence provides
opportunity.
104. See Colleen Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 320–26 (2010); Anne Kelley,
Practicing in the Patent Marketplace, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 115–17 (2011).
105. See Burk, supra note 24, at 1021.
106. See Amy L. Landers, Liquid Patents, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 199 (2006); Michael Risch,
Patent Portfolios as Securities, 63 DUKE L.J. 89 (2013); see also Michael J. Burstein, Patent
Markets: A Framework for Evaluation, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 507 (2015) (questioning the development
of securitized patent markets).
107. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46 (2008) (arguing that patents routinely
fail as property rights due to claim ambiguity); Golden, supra note 57, at 323 (stressing the
importance of patent claim certainty); see also Janet Freilich, The Uninformed Topography of
Patent Scope, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 150, 162–63 (2015) (arguing that patent scope will be suboptimal because it is set too early in the life of the patent).
108. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
“For a word to be spoken,” Ged answered slowly, “there
must be silence. Before, and after.”109
My argument here is in some sense a variation on the familiar
realist question of law in action versus law in the books.110 The
common trope on the books regarding patents is that they are about
disclosure, but uncritically accepting the conventional wisdom may
blind us to what patents are about in practice. I suggest that such
myopia misses not the forest for the trees, but the ground for the
figure. Far from constituting a defect in patent disclosure, discursive
silences may be a critical feature to their function. If patents are to act
as boundary objects, silence is as important as articulation. Both
disclosure and non-disclosure have a role to play, in which case we
may do better to ask not simply where more disclosure might be called
for, but where there should be less; not only where clarity is desirable,
but where there is virtue to vagueness.
What I have proposed is also ultimately an empirical project.
What we know of patent practice, and what we can discern from
patent structure, suggests the suitability of patents as boundary
objects. But that function can only be verified by field work to
determine how the communities around the patent actually interact
and whether they in fact use patents in the fashion that I have
suggested. This is work of a sort that, even amid the current spate of
empirical patent research, remains all too rare.
In the interim we should perhaps be cautious about calls to
expand or revise the patent’s intended audience in a quixotic (and
probably futile) quest to resolve every omission in the text of a patent.
My argument may also call into question proposals to more rigidly fix
the temporal resolution of the patent document.111 Standards that are
applied in different patent doctrines take as their point of assessment
different moments in the history of the document; one commentator
has suggested that this multiplicity of standards is confusing and that
a single reference point should be chosen for all of the various
requirements.112 But patterns of overlap and lacunae between the
patent’s doctrinal reference points also provide interpretive spaces,

109. LE GUIN, supra note 1, at 185.
110. See Jean-Louis Halperin, Law in Books and Law in Action: The Problem of Legal
Change, 64 ME. L. REV. 45 (2011) (tracing the origins of the distinction).
111. See Lemley, supra note 48.
112. See id.
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and while simplicity has its virtues, rigidity may instead disable
patents from serving as passage points to foster innovation.

